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Accounting is a fundamental underpinning of capital markets, 
and the worldwide spread of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) marks one of the most advanced attempts to 
develop globally consistent financial rules. The financial crisis 
has generated heated debates on the economic role of fair value 
accounting and other IFRS principles. Underlying these contro-
versies are differing views about the mission and governance 
of  accounting  standard-setters,  and  how  standards  interact 
with other public policy instruments. The absence of relevant 
precedents  for  the  unique  institutional  features  of  the  IFRS 
Foundation,  the  global  standard-setting  organization,  makes 
choices  more  difficult.The  IFRS’  defining  promise  is  cross-
border comparability of financial statements, but the aim of 
global harmonization will not be fully achieved in the next few 
years. Given the varying pace and modalities of local IFRS adop-
tion, the IFRS Foundation must focus on the quality of its stan-
dards and the integrity of its brand. Standardsetting should serve 
investors’ information needs, leaving other public-policy goals 
to be met through local assessment by individual jurisdictions. 
The  foundation’s  governance  and  funding  framework  should 
strengthen its accountability to the global investor community. 
Active  monitoring  of  local  endorsement  and  implementa-
tion  practices  should  encourage  the  gradual  convergence  of 
“IFRS dialects” towards a true single global reporting language. 
THE IMPORTANCE AND CHALLENGES OF IFRS
Accounting standards are the norms that govern the prepara-
tion of financial statements by companies, and as such play a 
key role in the proper functioning of capital markets. All things 
being equal, better financial reporting reduces the cost of capital 
by allowing investors to better assess and compare companies’ 
financial situations and operations, especially for listed compa-
nies in which shareholders are dispersed and have no access 
to  inside  information.  Internationally  uniform  accounting 
standards can contribute to a better matching of capital-rich 
investors and capital-hungry issuers on a global scale, and are 
therefore an attractive economic proposition. 
This explains the emergence and rapid spread of IFRS, the 
roots of which go back to a 1973 initiative led by Henry Benson, 
a prominent British accountant. There are currently 38 IFRS 
standards, intended primarily for use by issuers of public securi-
ties.1 Since 2001, IFRS have been developed and updated by the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), a 16-member 
committee  that  meets  about  monthly  and  is  supported  by 
a 110-strong staff based in London. The IASB is appointed 
and financed by the US-incorporated IFRS Foundation, itself 
governed by a group of 22 Trustees under a set of rules dubbed 
its “constitution.” In 2009 the Trustees agreed to submit their 
1. Somewhat confusingly, these are numbered IAS 1 to IAS 41 and IFRS 1 
to IFRS 9, as the label was changed from IAS (International Accounting 
Standard) to IFRS in 2001. Some past standards are no longer in use. To 
these should be added so-called IFRS interpretations (25 currently in use), 
which depending of the context can be referred to as part of the collective set 
known as IFRS. Separately, a standard intended primarily for use by non-listed 
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own appointments to mandatory approval by an ad hoc 
group of public authorities called the Monitoring Board.2 
Arguably  the  most  important  milestone  so  far  in 
the expansion of IFRS was the decision by the European 
Union  in  2000–02  to  require  their  use  by  all  listed 
companies  by  2005,  in  near-total  consensus  at  the 
time3. In its wake, other major jurisdictions have made 
IFRS or variations thereof either mandatory in replace-
ment of pre-existing national accounting standards, or 
an optional alternative. In 2007, the US Securities and 
Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  authorized  US-listed 
foreign  companies  to  use  IFRS.  However,  domestic 
US issuers still have to use the standards set by the US 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), known as 
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
Figure 1 illustrates how the IFRS’ “market share” among 
the  world’s  largest  companies  has  risen  rapidly  from 
marginal to dominant, and how the EU has been joined 
by other jurisdictions that together will soon represent the 
majority of IFRS issuers. 
Accounting  standards,  like  any  measurement  and 
disclosure  framework,  can  influence  the  behavior  of 
economic actors, even if this is not the standardsetters’ 
intention. This helps explain the occasional intensity of 
related controversies. Box 1 summarizes recent disputes 
about the fair value accounting principle. Moreover, not 
all accounting disputes are about fair value. In the United 
States, for example, there were numerous controversies 
about accounting standards for mergers and acquisitions 
in the 1950s, leases and conglomerates in the 1960s, oil 
exploration costs and inflation in the 1970s, pension obli-
gations in the 1980s, and stock options in the 1990s and 
early 2000s (Zeff 2005). Emissions trading permits are 
also likely to give rise to heated future discussions in those 
jurisdictions that adopt them, including the European 
Union.4 
The  economic  impact  of  accounting  standards 
has  major  implications.  Standard-setters  are  generally 
2. The Monitoring Board currently includes the chair of the US SEC,  
the European Commissioner for the Internal Market, the Commissioner  
of the Japanese Financial Services Agency, and two representatives of  
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).  
Further expansion of its membership is under consideration  
(Monitoring Board, 2011). 
3. The key corresponding legislation, Regulation (EC) No. 1606–2002,  
was adopted by 492 votes in favor out of 526 by the European  
Parliament, and unanimously by the Council. 
4. The IASB has started discussion on a standard on emissions  
trading schemes in 2009, currently on hold but expected to restart 
later in 2011. 
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Figure 1     Adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards 
  (IFRS) among the world’s 500 largest listed companies
US GAAP = US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles; EMEA = Europe, Middle East, and Africa
Source: FT Global 500 rankings, Datastream, author’s calculations. Standards that include some varia-
tions from pure IFRS, such as in the EU (see last section), are counted as IFRS in these graphs. Estimates 
for 2012 are based on the 2009 sample of companies, assuming IFRS use in Brazil, Canada, Japan 
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Box 1     The fair value controversy1
The fair value accounting measurement principle (often referred to as “mark-to-market”) relies on market prices to determine 
the book value of financial instruments. If there is no relevant market price, or if the market is not sufficiently liquid and/or deep, 
then the book value is the market price of a similar instrument, and if this is also unavailable, it is based on a financial valuation 
model, typically based on discounted cash flows. Both IFRS and US GAAP apply fair value measurement to some but not all 
financial assets and liabilities. For example, financial instruments held for trading purposes are booked at fair value, while fixed-
income instruments held to maturity are booked at amortized cost— i.e., booked at purchased cost and irreversibly impaired 
when it no longer appears that they will be repaid to maturity. These measurement categories differ between IFRS and US GAAP; 
however, under both sets of standards, the scope of fair value accounting (i.e., which assets and liabilities are measured at fair 
value) currently corresponds to significantly less than half of the balance sheet for most financial institutions. For example, Laux 
and Leuz (2010) estimate that about 36 percent of assets are reported at or close to fair value in large US bank holding compa-
nies, and that the corresponding proportion is much lower in smaller banks. In other terms, both sets of standards remain far 
from “full fair value,” namely the measurement of all financial instruments according to the fair value principle. 
At the start of the financial crisis in 2007-08, many financial executives called for the suspension of fair value accounting, 
claiming that the sudden disappearance of liquidity from markets such as those for US mortgage-based securities had made 
market price references for the value of their assets meaningless. At the height of the crisis in October 2008, EU policymakers 
strong-armed the IASB into hastily amending their IAS 39 standard on financial instruments to allow financial firms to retroac-
tively reclassify assets in order to escape the requirement to mark them to market prices, at a high cost in terms of perceptions 
of the IASB’s integrity.2 Separately, in April 2009, the US FASB loosened its standard on financial asset impairments. The IASB 
later adopted a new financial instruments standard (IFRS 9) that redefines the scope of fair value accounting, even though 
whether the overall impact will be a restriction or expansion of that scope will depend on individual cases. 
Numerous subsequent studies from public authorities and academics (e.g. Escaffre et al., 2008; SEC, 2008b; Novoa et al., 
2009; Coval et al., 2009; FCAG, 2009; Huizinga and Laeven, 2009; and perhaps most comprehensively Laux and Leuz, 2010) 
concluded against blaming fair value accounting for accelerating the crisis. More specifically, these studies generally find that 
fair value does not intrinsically generate financial instability, but that capital requirements that rely too directly on financial 
accounting can result in harmful procyclical effects, and therefore they generally recommend “prudential filters” in regulatory 
capital calculations to mitigate the effect of short-term accounting volatility on capital requirements, rather than “breaking 
the thermometer” by reducing the scope of fair value in the accounting standards themselves. Dissenters (e.g. Bezold, 2009; 
Marteau and Morand, 2009) fail to provide any empirical evidence for their harsh assessment of the fair value principle. 
Perhaps more to the point, many high-profile calls for suspension of fair value were made in 2007 and early 2008, as the 
market price of US mortgage-based securities and other assets, including AAA-rated ones, declined sharply, and financial 
firms, trade associations and some regulatory authorities argued that market prices were artificially depressed by “fire sales” 
and therefore should not be the basis for accounting measurements. For example, the Bank of England argued in its April 
2008 Financial Stability Report that the prices of ABX indices, an oft-quoted reference for US mortgage-based securities (MBS) 
based on a diversified basket of actual MBS transactions, were undervalued by 20 percent compared with in-house financial 
models based on probabilities of default and losses given default. But these market price declines eventually appeared to be 
justified by fundamentals, as most corresponding instruments continued to further lose market value later in 2008 and never 
regained their mid-2007 or even early-2008 levels even as liquidity issues were resolved. The possibility of a bias in financiers’ 
perceptions is illustrated by the fact that the leading US advocate of suspending fair value accounting in early 2008 was Martin 
Sullivan, then CEO of AIG.3 
Even so, many leaders still view fair value accounting as a negative factor in the crisis, particularly in Europe (Sarkozy, 
2010). 
1. See also Véron (2008) for a more in-depth analysis of arguments over fair value. 
2. The IASB’s chairman was widely reported as having come close to resigning at this occasion. See David Jetuah, “Tweedie nearly quit after fair value change,”   
  Accountancy Age, 12 November 2008. 
3. See Francesco Guerrera and Jennifer Hughes, “AIG urges ‘fair value’ rethink,” Financial Times, March 14, 2008N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 1   J u l y   2 0 1 1
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accounting professionals by background and see their role as 
intrinsically technical, namely finding the best measurement and 
disclosure principles for financial statements to give investors 
the information they need. But corporate issuers tend to view 
them like policymakers, and often attempt to influence them 
accordingly. Auditors also have special interests in the process, 
especially in those cases where the wording of the standards may 
affect their future legal liability. Governments can have multiple 
and  sometimes  conflicting  public  policy  objectives  beyond 
the efficiency of capital allocation, such as using accounting 
standards to influence corporate behavior, or leveraging their 
control over the standard-setting process for their own infor-
mation needs for tax, regulatory or statistical purposes, not to 
mention the possibility of the occasional capture of public deci-
sionmaking by private special interests which can be facilitated 
by the arcane content of some accounting discussions. These 
diverging  perspectives  imply  that  the  quality  of  accounting 
standards can only be considered in reference to a specific group 
of stakeholders, rather than in absolute terms. They also explain 
why the most intractable policy debates about IFRS relate to 
the governance of the standard-setting process, i.e. to which 
stakeholders it effectively gives priority. 
The second half of 2011 will be particularly important in 
shaping the future of IFRS, with: 
n  Adjustments to be made to the IFRS Foundation’s governance, 
in the context of a recent gradual loss of trust by key constitu-
encies, including global investors particularly since the IAS 39 
amendment of October 2008 (see Box 1). The trustees have 
published a “Strategy Review Report” that proposes impor-
tant parameters for future development (IFRS Foundation, 
2011), and the Monitoring Board has launched a parallel 
public consultation (Monitoring Board 2011); 
n	Financial strains and the foundation’s increasing reliance on 
voluntary funding from the “Big Four” global accounting 
networks,5 as illustrated by Figure 2, which raise concerns 
about independence and the medium-term viability of the 
current funding model; 
n	A commitment by the SEC to decide in 2011 on the adop-
tion of IFRS by the United States (SEC 2008a). Harvey 
Goldschmid,  an  influential  Trustee,  has  argued  that  a 
negative  outcome  or  further  delay  “would  likely  have 
tragic consequences” (Goldschmid 2010). Even with a less 
dramatic assessment, this is potentially as important for 
IFRS as the EU endorsement decision was a decade ago; 
n	Major  changes  of  leadership  at  all  levels:  the  IASB’s 
chairman for its first decade, David Tweedie, was replaced 
5. Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
on  July  1  by  Hans  Hoogervorst,  a  former  Dutch 
Finance minister and securities regulator; the trustees’s 
chair is vacant since the death of Tommaso Padoa-
Schioppa in late 2010; and the Monitoring Board, 
initially chaired by Hoogervorst, must also give itself a 
new head. 
ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE CORE: A 
CONSISTENT GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
Global organizations tend to fall into one of two main 
categories. Those in the public sector, such as the United 
Nations (UN) or the International Monetary Fund, gener-
ally  have  a  state-based  governance  model  which  holds 
them accountable to individual governments. Those in the 
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Figure 2    The IFRS Foundation’s deficits and dependence  
  on “Big Four” audit networks
Source: IFRS Foundation’s Annual Reports (2002–09) and presentation on Financial Position 
(April 2011, available on www.ifrs.org); author’s calculations.
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private sector generally have a stateless governance model that 
involves either accountability to a community of stakeholders 
not defined by nationality (such as corporations vis-à-vis their 
shareholders, or global partnerships vis-à-vis their partners), or 
no formal accountability mechanism other than reputational 
(as in the case of many charities, NGOs and foundations, which 
are essentially self-governed). 
The IFRS Foundation started as a self-governed organiza-
tion under a stateless governance model, embedded in its consti-
tution as initially adopted in 2001. However, the foundation 
subsequently made two major steps towards a state-based model. 
n	First, in 2006 it adopted a new funding strategy based on 
“non-voluntary contributions” calculated for each country 
(and the European Union) in proportion to GDP. This 
now  partly  implemented  scheme  makes  the  foundation 
dependent on the support of each relevant government, 
which has a monopoly on legal coercion to pay. It is thus 
functionally equivalent to voluntary funding by govern-
ments, which gives them significant potential leverage. 
n	Second, the 2009 creation of the Monitoring Board, to 
which the trustees granted the control of their own selection 
and  reappointments,  established  this  state-based  group, 
composed  of  representatives  of  individual  governments 
(and the European Commission), as the de facto highest 
governing body of the IFRS Foundation. The consequences 
of this major change are gradually unfolding.6 
Unfortunately,  this  increasingly  state-based  model  jars 
with the IFRS Foundation’s mandate. The purpose of public 
financial reporting is to correct information asymmetries to the 
benefit of dispersed investors, an aim that has been confirmed 
by both the Monitoring Board (2009) and the Trustees’ Strategy 
Review Report. This primacy of investors (even if it remains 
contested  by  some  stakeholders,  particularly  in  continental 
Europe)  calls  for  a  stateless  governance  model  that  would 
make the IFRS Foundation accountable to the global investor 
community. This is because investors generally do not act on 
the basis of territoriality and their interests cannot be properly 
represented by individual governments, which typically tend to 
favor the more powerful countervailing interests of corporate 
issuers, or by national securities regulators, which are ultimately 
accountable to their respective governments. Indeed, in most 
advanced economies, governments have come to the conclusion 
that high-quality accounting standards required an independent 
6. The name of the Monitoring Board is a misnomer, as its powers already go 
well beyond monitoring and can be expected to further expand in the future 
(Monitoring Board 2011)—even though the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the trustees and members of the Monitoring Board, that establishes 
this transfer of power, can theoretically be revoked. 
standard-setter with dominant input from the private sector.7   
A purely state-based model is bound to gradually transform 
the IFRS Foundation into an “accounting UN” which would 
permanently seek compromises between different understand-
ings of the public interest (including the multifaceted concept 
of “financial stability”) in different jurisdictions, and would find 
it practically impossible to deliver standards that serve inves-
tors’  information  needs.  The  corresponding  deterioration  of 
the quality of IFRS may eventually result in the emergence of 
competing standards preferred by investors, possibly causing a 
new episode of fragmentation. 
Conversely, the significant economic impact of accounting 
standards  implies  that  a  purely  stateless  governance  model 
would be unrealistic. Therefore, the IFRS Foundation has to 
invent an innovative hybrid of state-based and stateless models, 
reflecting its unique global policymaking position in the absence 
of a global government that could play the same role as govern-
ments do in national environments. The scattered nature of 
the investor community, which has hindered the emergence of 
organizations that would represent it at global level,8 represents 
an additional difficulty which the Foundation can overcome 
only by taking a proactive role of “community organizing.” Not 
enough thought has been given so far to possible corresponding 
options. Box 2 describes one imperfect, tentative scheme, to 
which more debate could certainly bring improvements. 
Other  steps  should  also  be  considered  to  improve  the 
IFRS  Foundation’s  governance,  particularly  in  terms  of 
geographical  balance.9  The  Monitoring  Board’s  public-sector 
membership should be expanded to major emerging econo-
mies, and the European Union should be represented by the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) rather than 
the European Commission, as securities regulators are generally 
best placed among public authorities to understand and support 
the IFRS Foundation’s mission to serve the information needs 
of investors.10 The trustee level should be reinforced by making 
the chair of trustees a full-time position, and by more clearly 
separating their secretariat from the IASB’s staff. This secretariat 
7. For example, in Canada, Japan and the United States, public authorities 
have less direct control over national accounting standard-setters than the 
Monitoring Board has over IFRS Foundation trustee appointments. 
8. The CFA Institute and the International Corporate Governance Network 
have a claim to represent global investors, but arguably not sufficient to be 
formally embedded in the IFRS Foundation’s governance framework (N.B. the 
author participates in committees of both these organizations). 
9. For more detail, including a proposal for jurisdictions’ respective voting 
power within the Monitoring Board, see the author’s responses to recent 
public consultations (Véron 2011a and 2011b). 
10. Simultaneously, financial regulatory bodies such as the Basel Committee 
should further develop prudential ‘filters’ to mitigate the geographical distor-
tions and procyclical impacts that may be induced by their capital and leverage 
standards if these are too directly based on IFRS accounting.N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 1   J u l y   2 0 1 1
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could be located in the Americas, and the monitoring board’s 
secretariat in Asia, or vice versa. Geographical balance should 
also be sought among the chairs of the Monitoring Board, the 
trustees and the IASB.11 
ADAPTABILITY ON THE GROUND: 
ACCOMMODATING THE WORLD’S DIVERSITY
Full global accounting harmonization is the promise of IFRS 
and should remain the long-term goal. But it will not be reached 
any time soon. China, India and Russia have made significant 
steps towards IFRS but appear in no mood to renounce the 
option of keeping some of their standards different. At the time 
of writing, the United States seems likely to adopt an approach 
colloquially known as “condorsement” (blend of “convergence” 
and “endorsement”), under which some US standards would 
only gradually converge towards their IFRS equivalents, while 
others would be replaced by IFRS outright (SEC 2011). Japan 
is widely expected to cautiously follow the steps taken by the 
United  States.  Even  the  EU,  in  spite  of  its  past  pioneering 
approach  to  IFRS,  has  often  appeared  to  disagree  with  the 
IASB in recent years and may not endorse all its standards in 
11. In early October 2010, the last time all three positions were permanently 
filled, they were all held by Europeans (respectively Hans Hoogervorst, 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, and David Tweedie). 
the future.12 At least for some time, there will be several “IFRS 
dialects,” some close to “pure IFRS” (all standards as adopted by 
the IASB), some only remotely comparable. 
As discussed in the previous section, IFRS standard-setting 
should be focused on the information needs of investors, and 
the IFRS Foundation cannot itself integrate multiple and occa-
sionally divergent views of the public interest around the world. 
This makes it legitimate that individual jurisdictions should be 
able to not endorse all IFRS standards, if they believe they have 
valid public-interest reasons not to. In the European Union, 
Regulation  (EC)  1606-2002  states  that  only  standards  that 
“are conducive to the European public good” should be endorsed. 
Most other jurisdictions have similar safeguard clauses or can be 
expected to introduce them. 
However,  this  discretion  should  not  be  abused.  Cross-
border comparability of financial statements is a global public 
good that depends on maximum harmonization of accounting 
standards.13 To avoid a harmful proliferation of IFRS dialects, 
there should be proper incentives for convergence: 
12. There is already one case of such divergence, as the European Union has 
“carved out” (deleted) part of the IAS 39 standard on financial instruments 
when endorsing it in late 2004. 
13. As numerous studies have established, harmonization of accounting stan-
dards is not a sufficient condition for cross-border financial reporting compara-
bility, which also depends on cultural and institutional factors including audit 
quality and public enforcement. But it is a necessary condition nevertheless. 
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Box 2     A tentative proposal for investor representation at the top of the IFRS Foundation
The IFRS Foundation would put in place a global Investor Consultation Network, using Internet-based tools to 
be able to directly consult individuals who are professionally involved in investment activities, with an adequate 
process  of  voluntary  registration  and  checking. This  would  serve  as  a  sounding  board  to  validate  appoint-
ments of investor representatives, which only become effective after a sufficient number of network members 
(representing a sufficient turnout) have endorsed them. The Trustees would appoint an Investor Representative 
Selection Committee of, say, 15 individuals who command trust from the global investor community. Following 
this initial appointment the committee would renew itself by cooptation, with all initial and subsequent appoint-
ments subject to validation by the Investor Consultation Network. The Investor Selection Committee would nomi-
nate Investor Representatives to the Monitoring Board (also subject to validation by the Network), whose number 
would gradually increase and eventually represent the majority of the board. 
Investing entities (such as asset management companies, investment funds, sovereign wealth funds, family 
offices, etc.) would be encouraged to contribute to the IFRS Foundation’s financing on a voluntary basis. This 
voluntary funding scheme would be more sustainable than the one adopted by the IFRS Foundation in the past, as 
investors’ interests are more directly aligned than those of issuers with the IFRS Foundation’s mandate. Naturally, 
such a voluntary funding mechanism, which would take significant time and resources to establish, could only 
gradually replace the Foundation’s current funding model. 
The constitution would be amended to make the Monitoring Board an integral body of the IFRS Foundation, 
rather than an external group as it is now, and introduce qualified-majority voting rules for Monitoring Board deci-
sions. The constitution would also make it a condition that trustees could only be appointed if their past experi-
ence gives credence to their commitment to high-quality standards that serve the needs of capital providers. N u m b e r   Pb1 1 - 1 1   J u l y   2 0 1 1
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n	First, jurisdictions that choose not to endorse a standard 
should disclose the public interest motives underlying their 
decision, and why such motives override the advantages of 
convergence. 
n	Second, if jurisdictions endorse a standard with modifica-
tions, they should not keep its IFRS name—for example, the 
“carved-out” version of IAS 39 in the European Union should 
be given a different, EU-specific label to avoid confusion. 
n	Third, translations into local languages should be subject to 
stricter control and validation by the IFRS Foundation in 
order to avoid low-quality translations, or diverging trans-
lations into the same language.14 
n	Fourth, issuers should be clear about which set of standards 
they are using, whether “pure IFRS” or the locally endorsed 
“dialect,” and auditors and regulators should not tolerate 
fuzziness—IOSCO has initiated efforts in that direction 
but more needs to be done. 
n	Fifth, all jurisdictions should allow the use of “pure IFRS” as 
an alternative to the local “dialect,” and make it compulsory 
for cross-border listings, possibly with limited “reconcilia-
tion requirements” as the United States has long required 
from foreign issuers. The largest or most internationally 
active companies in most jurisdictions would be likely to 
opt for pure IFRS in order to better compare themselves 
to their global peers, and this would enhance the status of 
pure IFRS vis-à-vis local dialects. 
The IFRS Foundation cannot impose such practices but 
could  encourage  their  adoption  and  monitor  compliance, 
naming and shaming free-riders and thus discouraging compa-
nies and countries from claiming adoption of IFRS when they 
only  “speak  dialect.”  More  generally  the  foundation  should 
produce more detailed jurisdiction-level data on the status of 
IFRS endorsement and use by various categories of compa-
nies, as part of an expanded research capacity (including on 
the economic effect of IFRS), which is rightly called for by the 
trustees’ Strategy Review Report.
In the case of the United States, the fifth proposal would 
mean the coexistence of two sets of standards, with some US 
companies  using  pure  IFRS,  and  others  using  the  modified 
US GAAP under the “condorsement” approach, in other words 
the US dialect of IFRS. Past and present examples including 
Germany, Japan, Switzerland, and the United States itself with 
the  option  given  to  foreign  issuers  since  2008  to  use  IFRS 
instead  of  US  GAAP,  suggest  this  would  be  manageable.15 
14. For example, the French translation of IFRS used in Canada has been 
validated by the IASB, but the translation that has binding status in France is a 
different version produced by the EU’s translation services.
15. A similar proposal has been made by Leuz (2011). 
Also, the SEC should endorse most IFRS standards early on, 
and adopt the “convergence” approach only for a handful of 
really  contentious  cases,  which  may  include  conditions  for 
asset  impairments,  definition  of  contingencies,  some  aspects 
of  financial  instruments  accounting  (including  the  scope  of 
fair value accounting) and revenue recognition, research and 
development accounting, and inventories. This would create 
trust and a sense of commitment, and would also encourage 
constructive approaches in other jurisdictions. 
Flexibility will also be needed to determine which companies 
should report under IFRS, beyond the large listed issuers whose 
use of IFRS generates most of the benefits in terms of cross-
border comparability. At least for some time, local accounting 
standards could remain in use for non-listed and even possibly 
smaller listed companies,16 and for single-entity (as opposed as 
consolidated) accounts which are embedded in local corporate 
and tax law and whose shift to IFRS can generate mismatches.17 
Finally, comparability crucially depends on how the standards 
are implemented and enforced. The Trustees’ Strategy Review 
Report’s proposal that “the IASB will work with a network of 
securities regulators, audit regulators, standard setters and other 
stakeholders to identify divergence in practice” is a welcome 
initiative in this respect. This may not preclude enforcement 
authorities, such as the SEC in the US, from issuing local guid-
ance on IFRS application, as long as such guidance does not 
contradict IFRS. This amounts to local “accents” that would not 
threaten the integrity of the IFRS “language,” even though it 
would also incentivize the IASB to gradually amend its standards 
and its own interpretations in order to reduce corresponding 
regional differences. In the European Union, any corresponding 
guidance should be issued by ESMA, which should also strongly 
coordinate IFRS enforcement at the EU level. Such regional and 
global efforts towards consistent implementation are necessary 
complements to standards harmonization in order to maximize 
the economic value of IFRS adoption. 
The  vision  of  full  global  harmonization  of  financial 
reporting appears increasingly ambitious as the world gradu-
ally discovers the ramifications of IFRS adoption. Its ultimate 
success  is  not  guaranteed.  But  the  prize,  a  globally  unified 
accounting language that can contribute to reducing the cost of 
capital across the world, remains well worth the effort. With the 
right combination of clarity of purpose, institutional creativity, 
and flexibility on the ground, the IFRS promise can be brought 
ever closer to fulfillment. 
16. See Kevin Reed, “Allow small listed firms to duck IFRS,” Accountancy 
Age, May 18, 2011. In the US context, one of the five SEC Commissioners 
recently spoke in favor of IFRS adoption with an opt-out for “smaller report-
ing companies and other companies that have no international operations or 
aspirations” (Casey 2011).
17. See Rose Orlik, “IFRS critics see momentum gathering,” Accountancy Age, 
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